Morality, Human Nature, and Evolutionary Behavior

Responses to Books

“The Revolt of the Masses” by José Ortega y Gasset (1930)

While reading Ortega y Gasset’s The Revolt of the Masses, I was struck by the statement in the preface that a state should ideally be governed by an intellectual elite. At first glance, this idea appeals to me, perhaps somewhat naively, because for a long time I hoped that the world would naturally be governed by wise and idealistic people. Institutions such as the United Nations appear to be attempts at creating such a world order, yet in reality they often function more as compromise mechanisms between national interests and power blocs than as truly idealistic guiding bodies.

We can observe this same tension within our own national politics. Political parties proclaim their ideals, yet often do so through populist strategies, shaping their message to appeal as broadly as possible to the electorate instead of remaining fully faithful to their deepest convictions.

The central question is whether “the masses” truly possess the insight and long-term vision necessary to govern a society sustainably. Or would it be better for leadership to be entrusted to individuals with knowledge, experience, and integrity, in short, an elite? Yet this solution immediately raises new questions: who decides who belongs to such an elite? Which criteria should be used? And how can we prevent such an elite from eventually becoming complacent, detached, or even corrupt?

These questions are thousands of years old. In The Republic, Plato (Athens, ca. 427 BC – 347 BC) has his characters discuss different forms of government. His preference is for the philosopher-king: a ruler educated in justice and wisdom, and therefore uniquely suited to govern. Karl Popper (1902–1994) strongly criticized Plato’s view. According to Popper, it is dangerous to search for the “best ruler.” Far more important, he argued, is the design of a system in which bad leaders can be replaced peacefully and safely without bloodshed. According to him, therein lies the true strength of democracy.

This view is also shared by physicist Sean Carroll. In his podcast Mindscape, he emphasizes that elections alone are not proof of a functioning democracy. The decisive criterion is whether power can be transferred regularly and peacefully. Russia serves as a striking counterexample: elections exist, but the transfer of power itself appears systematically obstructed.

“Most People are Good” by Rutger Bregman (2019)

This title is the translation of the dutch title under which the book was published in The Netherlands. However this title immediately raises fundamental questions. What do we here actually mean by “good” or “goodness”? Whose standard are we using: Rutger Bregman’s own, that of a liberal democratic society, or perhaps that of a religious or extremist ideology? And if it is true that “most people are good,” what does that practically mean for our behavior or worldview? Is our society not already implicitly based on the assumption that most people generally behave in a civilized manner?

Bregman supports his thesis with historical examples in which people appear to behave morally under pressure. Yet the question remains whether these examples are representative of humanity as a whole. There seems to be no hard empirical basis that justifies such a claim on a global scale. Are there statistical data per continent or cultural region? And if so, which standard of “decency” would we use to measure it?

Perhaps the problem lies even deeper: dividing people into only two categories, those who are “decent” and those who are “not decent”, may simply be too simplistic. Human behavior always arises within a particular context. The way a person acts strongly depends on circumstances such as culture, upbringing, social pressure, fear, scarcity, power, or group dynamics.

What is considered moral or desirable in one culture may elsewhere be viewed as wrong or even immoral. Concepts such as good, bad, civilized, or evil therefore appear far less absolute than is often assumed. Perhaps every human being consists of a combination of both “decent” and less “decent” characteristics, with the balance differing from person to person and constantly shifting depending on the situation.

A person who is helpful and empathetic in times of peace may suddenly act harshly or violently under extreme pressure. Conversely, people who normally appear selfish may unexpectedly display courage or solidarity during crises. In this sense, “decency” becomes more of a dynamic spectrum than a fixed trait.

A single dramatic exception can sometimes be enough to completely destabilize a system. Consider an airplane carrying five hundred passengers, one of whom turns out to be a suicide terrorist. Although 99.8% of the people on board may be “decent,” one deviation can still lead to catastrophic consequences. What should we then do with the reassuring message that “most people are well-intentioned”? Does that fundamentally change our behavior or outlook on life?

Bregman opposes the idea that altruistic behavior ultimately stems from selfish motives and calls that view cynical. Yet perhaps it is more useful to reconsider the term “selfishness” itself. The term carries a heavy moral charge. Instead, we might speak of egocentrism or subjective survival logic.

A fitting metaphor is the oxygen mask on an airplane. Passengers are instructed to put on their own oxygen masks first before helping others. At first glance this may appear selfish, but in reality it is a necessary condition for being able to care effectively for others. More broadly speaking, an individual can only contribute to the survival of the group if they themselves remain capable of functioning.

From an evolutionary perspective, behavior that we consider “good” is therefore not necessarily morally elevated or noble. It may also be understood as an evolved behavioral strategy that increases the survival chances of both the individual and the group. Cooperation, empathy, and trust are beneficial in many circumstances, but so too can competition, aggression, and opportunism be advantageous in others.

What we call “good” is therefore not absolute, but often contextual, pragmatic, and culturally determined. One person may be more empathetic than another, yet precisely this variation may have evolutionary value. In some circumstances cooperative groups survive more successfully, while in others competitive or opportunistic traits provide advantages. In that sense, it may even be functional that not everyone fully “behaves decently.”

The popularity of Bregman’s book partly seems to stem from a deep human desire for a positive image of humanity, a form of collective self-affirmation. The message that we as a species are fundamentally good offers reassurance. That is understandable. Yet it becomes problematic when this idea is presented as something radically new or scientifically proven.

The notion that people are generally trustworthy has in fact formed the implicit foundation of society for centuries. If we truly believed that most people were fundamentally not decent, we would not trust an unfamiliar mail carrier, cross bridges built by others, or even comfortably engage in conversation with strangers. Social interaction functions precisely because the majority of people generally adhere to certain behavioral norms.

The English title of the book, Humankind: A Hopeful History, therefore sounds more modest and nuanced than the Dutch title Most People Are Decent. Perhaps the English version intentionally distances itself from the more normative and absolute wording of the Dutch title. Ultimately, “decency” remains more of a value judgment than an objectively measurable fact.

In conclusion, the book raises relevant questions and deserves appreciation for its optimistic view of humanity. At the same time, a reflective reader may place critical remarks regarding the definitions used, the burden of proof, and the normative framework within which concepts such as good, bad, and “decency” are presented.

Selfishness and Empathy

In our society, the concept of selfishness usually carries a negative meaning. People are often expected to feel guilty when acting “selfishly.” Yet one may ask whether selfishness, to a certain extent, is not actually a necessary trait for the survival of the individual.

From an evolutionary perspective, it is logical that an organism first attempts to secure its own survival. An individual completely indifferent to their own well-being would ultimately struggle to survive. At the same time, empathy and a sense of community are also of great importance. Human beings are social creatures who depend on others for safety, cooperation, and survival.

This creates a continuous tension between self-preservation and care for the group.

When someone behaves in an extremely selfish manner, this may lead to rejection by the community, thereby weakening cooperation and mutual trust. Yet when someone completely neglects themselves for the sake of others, this too may have harmful consequences. Human behavior therefore often appears to move between these two extremes.

Perhaps people experience feelings of satisfaction or happiness precisely when a certain balance exists between personal interests and social connectedness. In biological terms, processes such as dopamine release and other reward mechanisms may play a role, reinforcing behavior that proves evolutionarily beneficial.

From this perspective, selfishness and empathy need not be viewed solely as moral opposites, but may instead be regarded as complementary traits that evolved to make the survival of both the individual and the group possible.

Group Formation, Unfamiliarity, and Distrust

Concepts such as racism and xenophobia are often discussed in highly moralized terms. This is understandable given their historical and social consequences. Nevertheless, one may also attempt to examine the evolutionary and psychological mechanisms that may underlie such reactions.

Human beings evolved in relatively small groups in which the rapid recognition of potential threats could be important for survival. As a result, there may exist a natural tendency to be cautious toward unfamiliar situations, unfamiliar groups, or unfamiliar customs.

This form of caution does not necessarily relate exclusively to race or ethnicity. More broadly, human beings seem constantly engaged in assessing risk and reliability. This applies not only to social situations, but also to modern digital environments. Today, people must learn to judge whether an email is fraudulent, whether a website is trustworthy, or whether unknown digital communication may be dangerous. In these situations too, experience, distrust, pattern recognition, and risk assessment play important roles.

From this perspective, distrust may be viewed as a general evolutionary protective mechanism directed toward the unfamiliar or potentially threatening, rather than necessarily as hostility toward a particular race or culture.

Such initial caution does not in itself constitute racism. Distrust often diminishes when people gain experience, get to know one another better, or receive reliable information about the unfamiliar. Human history demonstrates that cooperation between different groups is entirely possible when mutual understanding and trust emerge.

The problem arises when natural caution transforms into rigid thinking, dehumanization, or the systematic negative judgment of others solely on the basis of origin, appearance, or culture. It is at that point that discrimination and racism emerge in their harmful forms.

Perhaps it is therefore wiser not only to morally condemn such human tendencies, but also to attempt to understand them. Understanding does not imply approval. Precisely by gaining insight into the origins of fear, group formation, and distrust, people may learn to deal with such feelings in a more conscious and responsible manner.